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Abstract: The history of rights shows that the struggle for the recognition of women’s rights was difficult 
enough and the recognition of the right of women to a life without gender violence has been even more 
difficult. With a perspective based in a socio-legal and critical approach, this article defends that the 
recognition of the right of women to a life free of gender violence must be seen as a conquest of the 
feminist movement and women’s organizations.  It was the struggle of the feminist movement which 
provided the catalyst for the recognition of women’s rights and the specific right of women to a life free 
of gender violence and to protection against such violence. But not only the recognition, also the praxis of 
the right of women to a life free of gender violence is important.  The right of women to a life free from 
gender-based violence cannot be fully realized without the implementation of this right at the 
international and the local level. The implementation of rights and the existence of social movements 
involved with the right to a life free from gender violence is decisive to transforms the demands for 
protection from violence and its eradication to be see not as a question of mercy, but as a question of 
justice; and putting the individual experiences of gender violence victims within a wider framework from 
which the abuse can be considered as a social problem. 
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Summary: I. LEGAL REFORMS AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST GENDER VIOLENCE; II. VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN AS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION; II.1. The recognition of women’s rights as “human rights”; II.2. 
The specification of gender violence as a violation of rights; III. RIGHTS AGAINST GENDER-BASED 
VIOLENCE. 
 
Gender violence was not regarded as being worthy of juridical intervention until 
quite recently. This obviously does not mean that it is a new phenomenon in our society. 
On the contrary, it has always existed. However, it was not acknowledged –being 
hidden behind the veil of “privacy” or “intimacy” or, even worse, it was justified within 
the context of a patriarchal ideology. Consequently, actions deserving social reproach –
as well as being against the most basic rights of equality and dignity of individuals– 
∗ This work has been undertaken within the project ‘The Treatment of Gender Violence in the 
Administration of Justice. Implementation and Effectiveness of LO 1/2004’ (DER2014-55400-R).  
1
 Professor of Legal Philosophy and Sociology of Law, University of Zaragoza, Spain 
(mcalvo@unizar.es).  
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 6 (June 2016) pp. 60-82    ISSN: 2340-9592    DOI: 10.17561/tahrj.v0i6.2930                           
60 
 
                                                 
MANUEL CALVO GARCÍA 
escaped legal and judicial intervention.   
In the final decades of the last century, the activities of feminist groups and 
women’s organisations –together perhaps with a modest contribution from scientific 
research– produced an awareness of the real significance and scale of a question of 
human nature of the utmost seriousness. Society and institutions in general became 
increasingly aware of this problem which eventually began to be regarded as being both 
reprehensible and punishable.  Gradually, legal mechanisms of control and social 
integration began to produce measures –essentially punitive – to confront this problem. 
Little by little, legal action also became more extensive and mechanisms for 
intervention went further than merely punitive measures through the development of 
regulations and public policies aimed at preventing aggression and protecting the 
victims of gender violence.   
 
The history of rights shows that while the struggle for the recognition of 
women’s rights was difficult enough, the recognition of the right of women to a life 
without gender violence has been even more difficult. An illustration of this is the fact 
that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) in 1979 did not specifically include gender violence. Subsequently, the 
General Recommendations nº 12 (1989) and nº 19 (1992) of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women redressed this “oversight”, emphasising 
that gender violence is a form of discrimination against women. Here again, as will be 
explained in detail in this paper, it was the struggle of the feminist movement which, in 
parallel with the development of forms of legal intervention for the eradication of 
gender violence, provided the catalyst for the recognition of women’s rights. This was, 
perhaps, the penultimate step in achieving the recognition of the specific right of 
women to a life free of gender violence and to protection against such violence. 
Progressively, through the activism of women’s organisations and the feminist 
movement, it has come to be recognised that gender violence not only harms women’s 
rights but is a clear violation of those rights.  
 
The focus of this paper may be linked with the propositions of Charles Tilly 
(2004) when he posed the question “Where Do Rights Come From?”. This is clearly a 
provocative title, like the thesis which this article contains. In Tilly’s opinion, the 
question can be asked from an analytic philosophical, a metaphysical or a rational action 
standpoint. But he understands, along with Moore, Tarrow and other authors involved in 
socio-historical research, that rights are first “historical products” and second “outcomes 
of a struggle” (Tilly 2004: 273). The lack of attention to the political dimension of 
rights and to the relationship between social movements and human rights is quite 
difficult to explain (Stammers 2009). Given this background, the socio-juridical and 
critical perspective on which this work is based seeks to provide the conceptual and 
practical tools necessary to show these connections. More specifically, this approach 
allows the recognition and the praxis of the right of women to a life free of gender 
violence to be seen as a conquest of the feminist movement and women’s organisations.   
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I. LEGAL REFORMS AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST GENDER VIOLENCE   
 
Women’s organisations made a decisive contribution to putting gender violence 
in the public arena and to developing mechanisms for its eradication by arguing that the 
problems of abused women were not simply individual problems, but a general social 
problem requiring political and juridical intervention. With this in mind, the feminist 
movement –especially at its early stages and particularly in the English-speaking world– 
fostered a strategy of social change based on policies of criminal intervention which 
marked the way ahead for the global movement against gender violence.   
 
The demands for legal intervention should be analysed in relation to the need to 
break the dead weight of the veil of privacy prevalent in a liberal legal culture. The 
demands of the feminist movements for legal intervention in the sphere of private 
relationships was a direct result of the fact that family privacy had repeatedly been used 
as a justification for not allowing judicial interference in the private sphere which, it 
was claimed, should be kept outside the public scrutiny of the courts and legal 
intervention. As an example of this doctrine and its consequences, the decision of the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina given in the State versus A. B. Rhodes in 1868 is 
frequently cited: 
 
…however great are the evils of ill temper, quarrels, and even personal conflicts inflicting only 
temporary pain, they are not comparable with the evils which would result from raising the 
curtain, and exposing to public curiosity and criticism, the nursery and the bed chamber. Every 
household has and must have, a government of its own, modeled to suit the temper, disposition 
and condition of its inmates. Mere ebullitions of passion, impulsive violence, and temporary 
pain, affection will soon forget and forgive, and each member will find excuse for the other in 
his own frailties. But when trifles are taken hold of by the public, and the parties are exposed and 
disgraced, and each endeavors to justify himself or herself by criminating the other, that which 
ought to be forgotten in a day, will be remembered for life2.  
 
This doctrine was repeated in innumerable subsequent judgements and persisted 
until the final decades of the last century, thereby guaranteeing criminal and civil 
immunity for aggressors (Siegel 1996).  
 
The need to break with the sanctification of the private sphere drove the 
tendency of feminist movements to fight for state intervention. This proposition is 
defended by Kristin A. Kelly (2003: 59 ff.), concentrating more on the indirect 
symbolic functions of juridical intervention than on the direct social control functions of 
the legal norms. In this context, the author analyses the feminist movement against 
domestic violence in the USA in the 1970s, a movement which emerged from the public 
exposure of such violence, from the perspective of the awareness of the problem which 
had the effect of battered women starting to share experiences –which contributed to 
deprivatizing the problem. This strategy is considered from the perspective of a 
movement of abused women fundamentally in the fight to achieve reforms “that would 
2 Available at: http://faculty.uml.edu/sgallagher/StatevRhodes.htm [last visited: January - 2015]. 
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make the legal system take domestic violence more seriously” (Kelly 2003: 68).  
 
The “juridification” of domestic violence was regarded as the most important 
means of achieving the recognition of gender violence within families as being a matter 
of public interest, and the law is seen in this sense as “the” instrument for definitively 
making it clear that domestic violence is a social problem. In countries where the law is 
considered to be one of the principal means of reinforcing values, the actions of feminist 
collectives and in particular of lawyers representing battered women focussed on 
developing legal and regulatory instruments aimed at empowering victims of abuse, 
both increasing their protection and at the same time increasing the sanctions against 
their assailants (Kelly 2003: 70). 
 
This tendency resulted from the confluence of a series of factors which include, 
in the first place, the actions of women’s movements and defenders of women victims 
of abuse in favour of using criminal law to provide justice and redress the lack of 
consideration of the rights of women who suffer violence for reasons of gender, which 
turned their situation into an issue of public and political concern. But also, in the 
second place, because the policies of control make criminal law an area particularly 
attractive for legal reform and, what’s more, at “low cost”3. 
 
Legal reform as a strategy against domestic violence was largely based on the 
indirect symbolic functions of juridical intervention and, in particular, of criminal 
reform, showing a clear tendency to use coercive judicial mechanisms to solve “social 
problems” and especially to deal with the phenomenon of violence against women4. In 
this context, the social demands of women turned into juridical demands. More 
specifically, these reforming processes were principally focussed on criminal law, 
which contributed to effecting a reduction in the objectives and actions in the struggle to 
end gender violence. Furthermore, a strategy based on legal reform structured around 
criminal reform can be seen as one of the conditions responsible for the initial lack of 
debate about human rights in the USA5 and in other ambits (Bodelón 2012). 
 
On the other hand, the margins of the welfare state opened up important areas of 
action for social reformers. The movement of women against domestic violence started 
from the bottom up, initially with the setting up of refuges for victims of abuse in the 
early 1970s, first in the UK (1972) and almost simultaneously in the USA (Minnesota, 
1973; Boston, 1974)6. The women’s movement developed from these initiatives and 
3 “Many politicians who oppose increases in public expenditure on ‘social programmes’ are more than 
happy to allocate resources to ‘the fight against crime’” (Coker, 2001: 802-3).  
4 Buzawa and Buzawa 2003: 4. This trend is changing as can be seen in the fourth edition of the cited 
work (Buzawa, Buzawa and Stark 2012: 11 ff.). 
5 Schneider 2008: 358. The reflections made by Elizabeth Schneider, half way between legal activism 
directed towards social reform and theory, are especially interesting. In her opinion legal reform does not 
exclude a recognition of the possibilities of international human rights law as a valid instrument 
applicable at a local level (Schneider 2000: 53 ff.). 
6 Dobash and Dobash 2003: 25 ff., 60 ff. This movement gradually became more widespread. In Spain 
the first refuges opened in Madrid in 1986 and in Barcelona in 1987 (Bodelón: 2002: 339-348). 
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gender violence started to become visible in society. But little by little the social 
movements also claimed the right to actively use the transforming ability of juridical 
mechanisms and this led to intervention from the social policies with the objectives of 
victims’ protection and social transformation. As R. Emerson Dobash and Russell P. 
Dobash point out, “interventionist and welfare states provide greater opportunities for 
reformers attempting to effect changes within the institution of the state. The goal may 
be to introduce state involvement where once there was none or to alter existing 
policies, practices and legislation relating to particular groups or social issues”. 
Women’s movements frequently resorted to this alternative. The authors continue 
emphasizing the point that “it is critical that the battered women’s movements in Britain 
and the USA began in the 1970s when governments were generally more interventionist 
and welfare oriented” (Dobash y Dobash 2000: 189). 
 
In short, legal reform led to considerable advances, but eradicating gender 
violence and stamping out its causes required going one step further: to open the door to 
women’s rights and to seek intervention from the perspective of formulating policies to 
transform social relations in order to put an end to the discrimination and power 
asymmetry which feed gender violence. Why is it that such a commitment was not 
made in 1970 when the first steps towards legal reform were taken? Simply because the 
“right” of women to a life free of gender violence and to protection against such 
violence was not taken into account either at local or international levels. The idea of 
gender violence as a violation of a specific right of women took a long time to arrive. It 
took hold in the mid 1980s and particularly in the 1990s when the language of rights 
entered into the discourse and the political struggle of women to eradicate gender 
violence7. From then onwards, gender violence began to feature more prominently in 
the international agenda of organisations defending women’s rights and was finally 
considered both nationally and locally as a violation of those rights.  
 
 
II. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION 
 
II.1. The recognition of women’s rights as “human rights” 
 
The omission of women’s rights or their relegation to a position of minor 
importance in the most significant legal reforms of the 1970s and 1980s was the result 
of the omission of women in the general discourse of rights. If the 19th century was the 
century of the rights of “man”, much the same can be said of most of the 20th century. 
Quite apart from this play on words, it has to be said that the omission of women from 
international human rights law was not merely a linguistic slip. The Charter of the 
United Nations made way for the development of women’s rights, but the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights persisted with the omission, which was not merely a 
7 Sally Engle Merry (2009: 25) explains that in the 1970s and 1980s the movement against the abuse of 
women showed domestic violence to be a social problem and identified it as gender violence. Later, 
especially in the 1990s, these movements began to be associated with the human rights movement at both 
a national and an international level. 
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question of terminology. When the option of giving some prominence to women in the 
text of the Declaration was excluded from the drafting discussions, this also represented 
a rejection of the opportunity to emphasize the equivalence of the rights of women and 
men. In the interests of apparent universality and neutrality, a more decisive declaration 
in favour of the eradication of gender discrimination and the defence of the specific 
rights of women was left aside. 
 
Women’s rights made progress thanks to the incorporation of women into 
international organisations and the activities of women’s organisations. The first 
significant advance in the development of women’s rights occurred with the setting up 
of the Commission on the Status of Women within the framework of the United Nations.  
The advance of women in the public sphere at the time in which the Universal 
Declaration appeared was not reflected in the text, but it was an unavoidable reality. 
Arvonne S. Fraser (2007: 43 ff.) gives a detailed description of this important period in 
the origins of women’s rights. According to her, the development of women’s 
organisations and the increasing presence of women in national delegations was the 
result of the progress made by the women’s movement. Women had begun to access the 
labour market, the suffragettes had been successful in 31 countries and gradually, led by 
delegates from Latin American countries, women began to have a clear presence in the 
United Nations. Minerva Bernardino of the Dominican Republic, one of the four 
women who signed the Charter of the United Nations, proposed the creation of a 
Committee within the framework of the Commission on Human Rights to work on the 
promotion of women’s rights. After overcoming numerous objections, initially 
including the opposition of the powerful Eleanor Roosevelt, the Commission on the 
Status of Women of the United Nations was finally established on 21 June 1946.  
 
This Commission played a fundamental role in the development of women’s 
rights. It was responsible for the drafting of the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, adopted by the General Assembly on 7 November 
1967, the precursor of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, adopted in 1979. The Commission on the Status of 
Women of the United Nations also organised the United Nations Decade for Women and 
the World Conferences on Women held in Mexico, Copenhagen and Nairobi8. 
 
These initiatives changed the discourse of the United Nations and gave rise to 
the emergence of women as political agents and as having human rights, overcoming 
the limitations of discourses anchored in the language of the traditional “family of 
nations”, with its stereotypes and its implicit subordination of women. Networks and 
organisations of women with political experience demanded an end to sexual 
stereotypes and gender discrimination. They used the platform of the United Nations to 
8 This Decade was started after the World Conference of the International Women's Year held in Mexico 
City in 1975 and continued until 1985. During the decade two other World Conferences on Women were 
held: the World Conference on the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace 
(Copenhagen, 1980) and the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the UN 
Decade for Women (Nairobi, 1985). 
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exercise their rights, opportunities and responsibilities in equal measure to men, and to 
create a new international order – economic, social and political9. 
 
Another fundamental milestone in this period was the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women10. This Convention 
completed and gave legal backing to the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, stating the degree of concern regarding the continuance 
of generalised discrimination against women despite the Charter of the United Nations, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Right, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Gómez-Isa 2003: 298 ff.; Southard 1996). The adoption of the CEDAW was followed 
by a large number of international and regional human rights instruments. National 
governments were obliged to adopt measures and policies leading to the protection, 
observance and application of the rights of women11.  
 
These initiatives gained strength in a widespread and influential movement 
which contributed decisively to the recognition of women in the international sphere. 
The feminist movement had for many decades ignored the need to respond to the praxis 
of human rights that clearly failed to recognise women’s rights. In the 1980s a 
movement for the defence of women’s rights emerged internationally from the 
grassroots of civil society which articulated the slogan “women’s rights are human 
rights”. This bottom-up movement was involved in various activities ranging from the 
organisation of a defence network for the rights of women in the Philippines to the 
Encuentro feminista de mujeres latinoamericanas y del Caribe (Feminist Meeting of 
Latin American and Caribbean Women) in Bogotá (1981), which declared 25 
November as the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, and 
many other specific initiatives organised all over the world (Reilly 2009: 71). One of the 
most fruitful manifestations of this movement was related to the emergence and 
initiatives developed around the Global Campaign for Women's Human Rights and its 
Global Tribunal on Violations of Women's Human Rights12.  
 
Taking this process as a basis, Niamh Reilly has convincingly argued that the 
progress of women’s rights in the 1980s “did not happen suddenly or by accident. It was 
the result of well-organized, broad-based, transnational collaboration among diverse 
women’s rights advocates and NGOs –wherein the activities of the Global Campaign 
for Women's Human Rights played a major part” (Reilly 2009: 73). Although the 
9 Zinsser (2002: 144) has shown that the official documents of the Decade reveal that women had in fact 
modified the prevailing discourse. 
10 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 18 December 1979. It 
came into force on 3 September 1981. At the time of writing, 188 countries have ratified the Convention 
[https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-8&chapter=4&lang=en, last 
visited January 2015], attesting to the weight of the treaty in the international sphere of human rights. For 
the history of the Convention, see Reilly 2009: 46 ff. 
11 For an up-to-date account of the impact of the CEDAW, see Englehart and Miller (2014: 25 ff.). 
12 See Bunch and Reilly (1999) for a detailed description of the bottom-up organisational features and the 
strategies of both campaigns, together with the main documentary sources. 
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women’s movement developing from the Decade and the United Nations conferences in 
1975-1985 and culminating in the 1990s was very complex and was not free from the 
ideological and political struggles of the period (Ghodsee 2010: 3–12, Olcott 2010), 
there is absolutely no doubt that it provided the necessary spark and the decisive action 
in the period leading up to and during the World Conference on Human Rights held in 
Vienna in 1993, which finally resulted in women’s rights being fully recognised as 
human rights13.  
 
 
II.2. The specification of gender violence as a violation of rights 
 
The issue of violence against women was first specifically raised in 1980 at the 
World Conference on the United Nations Decade for Women held in Copenhagen in the 
context of the struggle against discrimination and the emergence of women rights 
described above. Its 48 resolutions included one entitled “Battered women and violence 
in the family” in which it is stated that domestic violence and violence against women 
in general represent “a problem of serious social consequences that perpetuates itself 
from one generation to the next”, a situation which is made more serious by the 
immunity from prosecution of persons who commit such acts of violence14. In fact, this 
issue had been a theme running through the debates and reports of the World 
Conference of the International Women's Year held in Mexico in 1975, and was even 
more apparent in the Third World Conference on Women which took place in Nairobi 
in 198515. It should be emphasized that these declarations were drafted within the 
context of the struggle for women’s rights led by the feminist movement during the 
United Nations Decade for Women (1975-1985)16. It has also been pointed out that 
these developments were very much the result of the fact that the majority of the 
government delegates were women. Credit must also be given to the work of forums 
representing NGOs undertaken in parallel with these conferences (Reilly 2009: 57-
58)17. 
13 UN-Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human 
Rights on 25 June 1993, (A/CONF.157/23), paragraph 18. 
14 UN-Report of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development 
and Peace, Copenhagen, 14-30 July 1980, A/CONF.94/35.  
See: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/copenhagen.html (last visited January 2015). 
15 Paragraph 231 of the report of the Nairobi conference calls for the adoption of effective measures to 
identify, prevent and eradicate domestic violence against women and children and the implementation of 
all kinds of measures for their protection and to impose sanctions on those guilty of such acts of violence. 
UN-Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations 
Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace (Nairobi, 15-26 July 1985) United Nations, New 
York, 1986. Nairobi Forward-looking Strategie [http://www.un.org/womenwatch/confer/nfls/]. 
16 UN-Advancement of Women, In-depth study on all forms of violence against women: Report of the 
Secretary-General (A/61/122/Add.1), 2006, (A/61/122/Add.1), p. 16 s. Subsequently published as: 
Ending violence against women: from words to action. Study of the Secretary-General, electronic 
resource: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/publications/English%20Study.pdf (last visited 
January 2015). This study includes contributions from a wide-ranging group of experts and is an 
important reference for the development of the right of women to a life free from gender violence.  
17 For the role of NGOs in this process, see  Tinker 1999: 95 ff. 
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The discourse on violence against women in the 1970s and 1980s was closely 
connected with the language of legal reform and the urgency of making progress in 
protecting victims and prosecuting aggressors. However, despite some exceptions, there 
was little direct use of the language of rights18. This may be the explanation for the 
“oversight”, mentioned above, of gender violence in the CEDAW and its revival in the 
discourse and the claims of women’s rights in the 1980s. The feminist movement had 
based its demands for legal and social intervention on facts. Scientific knowledge and 
the work of women’s organisations had brought to light a reality which was very 
widespread in our society and which it was difficult to continue to ignore behind the 
veils of intimacy or the private sphere. This knowledge and the existing data also began 
to be taken into account in the feminist movement for the defence of women’s rights 
and gradually permeated the activities of international organisations. The culmination of 
this process, which brought gender violence and especially domestic gender violence 
out into the open, can perhaps be found in the study on the extent of domestic violence 
published in 198919.  
 
The above explains why the consideration of gender violence as a violation of 
women’s rights was given after the adoption of the CEDAW in two general 
recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women: General recommendation No. 12, eighth session, 1989; and General 
recommendation No. 19, eleventh session, 199220. These recommendations place a 
specific obligation on states party to the Convention to protect women from any type of 
violence, including gender violence in the domestic sphere21. The Committee firmly 
establishes in General recommendation No. 19 that violence against women is a further 
form of discrimination against women “that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy 
rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men”. First, it establishes as a general 
observation that the definition of article 1 of the Convention: 
  
…includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman because she 
is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental 
or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. 
Gender-based violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether 
those provisions expressly mention violence (paragraph 6). 
 
In virtue of this, it is concluded that: 
 
Gender-based violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and 
18 Paradoxically, while questioning the omission of women’s rights in the discourse on human rights, 
Frank Hosken makes no reference to violence against women in his presentation to a “symposium on 
Women and International Human Rights” held at the time to define the rights of women (Hosken 1981: 1-
10). 
19 Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs – Office of the United Nations in Vienna, 
Violence Against Women in the Family, United Nations, New York, 1989. 
20 Freeman et al., 2012: 447 ff. 
21 Freeman et al., 2012: 454 ff. 
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fundamental freedoms under general international law or under human rights conventions, is 
discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (paragraph 7)22. 
Another of the fundamental advances of this Recommendation is to put an end to 
the argument that gender violence can not be considered a violation of rights on the 
grounds that it originates in private acts or in the private sphere23. Thus, it states that:  
 
discrimination under the Convention is not restricted to action by or on behalf of Governments 
(see articles 2(e), 2(f) and 5). For example, under article 2(e) the Convention calls on States 
parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any 
person, organization or enterprise. Under general international law and specific human rights 
covenants, States may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to 
prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing 
compensation (Paragraph 9).  
 
In short, violence against women was explicitly considered as a violation of 
women’s rights for which states have responsibilities and obligations. For this reason, 
states were requested to inform the Committee of measures adopted to overcome such 
violence24. Similarly, with the coming into force of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women25 states 
were given the opportunity to report to the Committee on any violation of rights related 
with the prohibition of gender violence as set out in the Convention in accordance with 
the interpretations of the General Recommendations 12 and 19 (Facio et al 2009: 79 ff.). 
 
As stated above, another important landmark in the definitive incorporation of 
the language of rights in the fight against gender violence can be found in the World 
22 General recommendations adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) [http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/index.html, last visited 
January 2015]. 
23 The duality of public-private spheres has served to avoid scrutiny on the part of international human 
rights law of private acts of torture and abuse and, in particular, to cover up the “subordination of women 
in the private sphere”. Vid. Chinkin (1999: 392 ff.). The reflections of Hilary Charlesworth (1999: 382-
383) are of interest here, pointing out that the consequences of this distinction are not neutral from the 
gender perspective given that in our society men dominate the public spheres of politics and government 
while women tend to see themselves  as being more limited in the private sphere of the home and the 
family. 
24 Rashida Manjoo, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences, submitted to the General Assembly, 1 August 2011 (A/66/215): “19. The prevalence of 
violence against women remains a global concern. For example, in the majority of the 21 countries 
considered by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in 2010, representing 
all regions, prevalence of violence was either high, persistent or on the increase. The Committee had 
already explicitly linked discrimination against women and gender based violence in its general 
recommendations No. 12 (1989) and No. 19 (1992). It constantly calls on States parties to include in their 
reports to the Committee information on violence and on measures introduced to overcome such 
violence”. Avalaible at: 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/439/45/PDF/N1143945.pdf?OpenElement, 
last visited January 2015 
25 Resolution of the General Assembly, October 1999 (A/RES/54/4). This protocol came into force on 22 
December 2000 and was ratified by Spain in July 2001. Vid., on the protocol, Felipe Gómez Isa (2003: 
291-321). 
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Conference on Human Rights held in 1993 which, as we have seen, asked the General 
Assembly to adopt the draft Declaration on Violence against Women and urged states to 
combat violence against women in accordance with the terms of the Declaration26.  
 
Following the demands made at the Vienna Human Rights Conference in 1993 
and the transformation of the claims occurring in the feminist movement27, the General 
Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women at the 
end of 1993. The Declaration makes it clear that violence against women is not only an 
obstacle to achieving equality, development and peace, as recognised by the Nairobi 
conference. It also represents an obstacle to the full application of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Following 
Recommendation 19 of the Committee it categorically states that “violence against 
women constitutes a violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women and 
impairs or nullifies their enjoyment of those rights and freedoms”. This Declaration is 
drawn up from a gender perspective, clearly stating that:   
 violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men 28. 
 
Another fundamental step in the recognition of the right of women to a life free 
of gender violence was Resolution 1994/45 of the Commission on Human Rights, 
adopted on 4 March 1994, under which it was decided to appoint a Special Rapporteur 
on violence against women, including its causes and consequences29. This established 
the first human rights mechanism specifically to deal with violence against women. 
Radhika Coomaraswamy from Sri Lanka was appointed as the first Special 
Rapporteur30. Her mandate was to seek and receive information from governments on 
26 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on 
25 June 1993 (A/CONF.157/23), paragraph 38. 
27 Sylvia Walby (2002) makes the following interesting reflection:  “By the early 1990s this demand to 
stop men’s violence against women …was translated into language and concepts more appropriate for the 
predominantly male forum of the UN, that is the language of human rights rather than men’s oppression 
of women. The demands were that women’s rights were human rights, and that violence against women 
constituted a violation of women’s human rights. This was a call for the transformation of the existing 
agenda of human rights and for a new interpretation that placed women’s issues at the heart of the 
mainstream”. 
28 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (A/RES/48/104). General Assembly 
resolution 48/104, 20 December 1993. 
29 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights in resolution 1994/45, adopted on 4 March 1994, 
decided to appoint a Special Rapporteur on violence against women, including its causes and 
consequences. The mandate was extended by the Commission on Human Rights in 2003, at its 59th 
session in resolution 2003/45.  
30 Radhika Coomaraswamy occupied the position until 2003. Her successor was Yakin Ertürk, from 
Turkey who held the post until 2009. Since then Rashida Manjoo, from South Africa, has been in the 
post. 
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violence against women, including domestic violence, and to recommend measures to 
eliminate such violence. Since 1994, by means of thematic reports, missions to various 
countries, consultations, meetings with experts, communications with governments and 
other mechanisms, the Special Rapporteur “has studied the forms, prevalence, causes 
and consequences of violence against women; analysed the legal and institutional 
developments in the protection of women against violence and the remaining 
challenges; and provided key recommendations to Governments and to the international 
community to overcome such challenges”31. 
 
The continuity of these milestones can be seen in many other developments 
including the Fourth World Conference on Women (4-15 September 1995; Beijing, 
China). After recalling  in paragraph 8 the need to implement the rights listed in the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, this Conference established 
in paragraph 29 of the Declaration and Platform for Action, as approved by 
governments, the need to “Prevent and eliminate all forms of violence against women 
and girls”. 
 
From this moment on, several resolutions and reports were issued within the 
system of the protection of human rights of the United Nations.  Among these, of 
particular note is the uncompromising stance against gender violence evident in the 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment of 200832. In this report, citing Rhonda Copelon (1994), 
gender violence is treated as a cruel, inhuman and degrading form of torture or 
punishment. Parallels are drawn with various other forms of violence against women 
and other actions recognised as torture: 
 
45. As with female detainees who experience torture, battered wives may be beaten with 
hands and objects, kicked, strangled, stabbed or burned. Rape and other forms of sexual 
abuse are used by intimate partners as well as by prison guards or police officers. In both 
scenarios, physical violence is usually accompanied by insults, varied forms of humiliation, 
and threats to kill or harm the victim or her family members (often children). Domestic 
violence, as well as torture, tends to escalate over time, sometimes resulting in death or 
leaving women’s bodies mutilated or permanently disfigured. Women who experience such 
violence, whether in their homes or in a prison, suffer depression, anxiety, loss of self-
esteem and a feeling of isolation. Indeed, battered women may suffer from the same intense 
symptoms that comprise the post-traumatic stress disorder identified in victims of official 
31 Rashida Manjoo, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences, submitted to the General Assembly, 1 August 2011 (A/66/215). Electronic version: 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/439/45/PDF/N1143945.pdf?OpenElement (last 
visited January 2015). The report offers a general overview of the work carried out during her mandate, as 
well as her main conclusions and the remaining challenges. The document includes a list of reports made 
by the Special Rapporteur. For information about the role of the Special Rapporteur in connection with 
violence against women, its causes and its consequences, see Merino-Sancho 2012: 71 ff. 
32 Manfred Nowak, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, 15 January 2008 (A/HRC/7/3). Available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/  (last 
visited January 2015). The interpretation of gender violence given at this time by the Committee against 
Torture was also of fundamental importance: General Comment No. 2: Implementation of article 2 by 
States parties, 24 January 2008 (CAT/C/GC/2). Available at: http://docstore.ohchr.org/  (last visited 
January 2015). 
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torture as well as by victims of rape. Another parallel between privately battering women 
and torture, which refers back to the element of powerlessness, is the intention to keep the 
victim in a permanent state of fear based on unpredictable violence by seeking to reduce the 
person to submission and destroy his/her capacity for resistance and autonomy with the 
ultimate aim of achieving total control. 
 
In fact, this idea of considering violence against women as a form of torture had 
already been put forward in academic studies linked to legal activism against gender 
violence (Copelon 1994) and also by the Special Rapporteur in her report of 1996: 
 
The argument that domestic violence should be understood and treated as a form of torture 
and, when less severe, ill-treatment, is one that deserves consideration by the rapporteurs and 
treaty bodies that investigate these violations together perhaps with appropriate NGO experts 
and jurists33. 
 
It can be seen that the extension of the recognition of violence against women for 
reasons of gender has involved not only those organisations specifically concerned with 
the protection of women’s rights. Little by little, it has also extended on an international 
level to those organs of the United Nations specifically concerned with the protection of 
human rights (Meyersfield, 2012: 58-79). With respect to the full recognition of gender 
violence as a violation of rights, especially noteworthy is the General Comment No. 28 
of the Human Rights Committee which also links gender violence with torture and 
abuse as set out in article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and which puts an obligation on states to provide “information on national laws and 
practice with regard to domestic and other types of violence against women”34. 
 
The process of recognising gender violence as a violation of rights is also apparent 
in the actions of regional human rights protection organisations. Regional organisations 
have recognised violence against women as a violation of the human rights of women 
and have demanded that states guarantee these rights35.  
 
As regards the Council of Europe, especially significant is the adoption of the 
Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women 
and domestic violence (Istanbul, 11/05/2011). Article 3 makes it clear that under the 
terms of the convention violence against women is a violation of human rights and a 
form of discrimination against women, which must be seen from the gender perspective: 
33 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences, submitted in accordance with the Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/85. 
(E/CN.4/1996/53, Fifty-second session), paragraph 50. Available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/ (last 
visited January 2015) 
34 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 28 Article 3 (The equality of rights between men and 
women), 29/03/2000 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10), pfo. 11. 
35 Vid.Meyersfield 2012: 79-91. For a broader perspective focusing on legal discrimination, progress to 
date and the gap existing between  the letter of regional mechanisms and actual practice, see Fareda 
Banda, Project on a Mechanism to Address Laws that Discriminate Against Women, Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights/Women’s Rights and Gender Unit, 2008: 23 ff. 
[http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/laws_that_discriminate_against_women.pdf, last visited  
May 2012] 
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“violence against women” is understood as a violation of human rights and a form of 
discrimination against women and shall mean all acts of gender‐ based violence that result in, or 
are likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering to women, 
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in 
public or in private life; 
 
In other regional spheres various instruments have been adopted aimed at defining 
domestic and gender violence as human rights violations. The most relevant include the 
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
Against Women, known as the “Convention of Belém do Pará” as it was adopted in this 
Brazilian city in 1994, and The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, known as the “Maputo Protocol”, both of 
which guarantee the rights of women together with the protection of women against all 
forms of violence including gender violence.  
 
The Convention of Belém do Pará states in article 3 that “every woman has the 
right to a life free of violence, both in the public and in the private sphere” and 
establishes an obligation on states to guarantee this right. Consequently, both the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights have acted to guarantee this right and other related rights (articles 4 and 5). 
Especially important is the decision of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights in the case of Maria da Penha given on 16 April 2001 (Report nº 54/01, Case 
12.051). This decision condemned the state of Brazil in the application of the 
Convention of Belém do Pará for not having intervened adequately in order to prevent 
and respond to the abuse of this woman. This decision obliged Brazil to enact a law 
against gender violence, the Ley Maria da Penha en defensa de los derechos de la 
mujer (Maria da Penha Law in defence of women’s rights)36. 
 
The other very relevant decision is the ruling of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights of 16 November 2009 in the case González y otras Vs. México (“Campo 
Algodonero”). This ruling concluded that the state had failed to comply with its duty to 
investigate – and thus its duty to guarantee– the rights enshrined in various articles of 
the American Convention on Human Rights and the Convention of Belém do Pará. The 
court also ruled that in this case the violence against the woman represented a form of 
discrimination. The state of Mexico was found guilty of human rights violations.  
 
Turning now to the African human rights system, on 11 July 2003 The Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa or 
the Maputo Protocol was adopted as an annexe to the Charter of 1986, specifically 
orientated to the recognition and protection of women’s rights. This protocol came into 
force in 2005 and represents one of the bases for the recognition of the right of women 
to a life free of violence37. After defining the concept of violence against women from a 
36 Law nº 11.340, 7 August 2006. See Spieler 2011: 137 ff. 
37 Meyersfield (2012: 90-91) has emphasized the importance of this text for the recognition of gender 
violence as a violation of rights, while pointing out that its implementation and effectiveness is another 
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gender perspective (article 1) and determining the obligation of states to prevent 
discrimination against women (article 2) and to ensure their dignity (article 3), it 
establishes in article 4.2 that: 
States Parties shall take appropriate and effective measures to: a) enact and enforce laws to prohibit 
all forms of violence against women including unwanted or forced sex whether the violence takes 
place in private or public; b) adopt such other legislative, administrative, social and economic 
measures as may be necessary to ensure the prevention, punishment and eradication of all forms of 
violence against women; c) identify the causes and consequences of violence against women and 
take appropriate measures to prevent and eliminate such violence; d) actively promote peace 
education through curricula and social communication in order to eradicate elements in traditional 
and cultural beliefs, practices and stereotypes which legitimize and exacerbate the persistence and 
tolerance of violence against women; e) punish the perpetrators of violence against women and 
implement programmes for the rehabilitation of women victims; f) establish mechanisms and 
accessible services for effective information, rehabilitation and reparation for victims of violence 
against women; … 
 
This is a complete and categorical definition which speaks for itself, recognizing 
that gender violence is a violation of human rights and requiring the intervention of the 
public authorities to guarantee such rights in the private as well as the public sphere.  
 
It is not only in the United Nations system but also in the regional systems of 
human rights where progress has been made in the recognition of the right of women to 
a life without violence, defining gender violence as a violation of rights and demanding 
the intervention of states and international organisations to protect and guarantee such 
rights. The struggle by women during decades has achieved first, the recognition of 
women’s rights; second, bringing the reality of gender violence into the open together 
with the violation of rights inherent in its various forms; and, third, the recognition of 
the specific right of women to a life free of any kind of gender-based violence. 
International law and social and academic discourse recognise that gender violence is 
not only an attack on the rights of women, but is also a violation of the right of women 
to a life free of violence.   
 
It has been a long process, but today it is at last unarguable that gender violence is 
a violation of human rights. At a local level, this process has been interrelated with 
advances in legal reforms and has furthered punitive strategies to the extent that gender 
violence has become regarded as a universal problem. This was pointed out by Jane R. 
Chapman (1990: 60) in her justification of the need to find space for the language of 
rights in the fight to end violence against women. Gender violence is certainly a crime, 
but it is much more than an offence. Therefore, if this social scourge is to be eradicated, 
it is essential to speak of it in the language of rights. Dealing with the problem in terms 
of human rights is especially productive because it provides a broader perspective 
without ignoring the advances implicit in criminal and other legal reforms.  
 
 
III. RIGHTS AGAINST GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 
question. 
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The struggle for the recognition of gender-based violence as a violation of 
women’s rights is of fundamental importance when attempting to extend the limits of a 
discourse based on the protection of civil rights and the politics of women. The 
recognition of the right to a life free of gender-motivated violence together with other 
rights pertaining specifically to women, in particular reproductive rights, take us much 
further than abstract ideas of equal treatment. They lead towards the recognition of 
rights vested in women in the broadest possible sense of the term and open the way to 
an acceptance of full equality without exceptions.   
 
The developments examined in the previous section indisputably show that the 
right to a life free of gender violence has full recognition within the international system 
of human rights38. This recognition has important legal consequences. This point is 
made in a report drafted by a group of informed experts as follows: 
 
There are important consequences that flow from categorizing violence against women as a 
matter of human rights. Recognizing violence against women as a violation of human rights 
clarifies the binding obligations on States to prevent, eradicate and punish such violence and 
their accountability if they fail to comply with these obligations. These obligations arise from the 
duty of States to take steps to respect, protect, promote and fulfil human rights. Claims on the 
State to take all appropriate measures to respond to violence against women thus move from the 
realm of discretion and become legal entitlements. The human rights framework provides access 
to a number of tools and mechanisms that have been developed to hold States accountable at the 
international and regional level. These include the human rights treaty bodies and international 
criminal tribunals, as well as the African, European and inter-American human rights systems39. 
 
The recognition at an international level of the right of women to a life free of 
gender violence thus has significant legal implications in addition to political and social 
consequences.  It puts an obligation on states to ensure this right is effectively exercised 
by implementing the appropriate legislative, administrative and other necessary 
measures. The right to a life free of gender-motivated violence can be exercised without 
any limitations or excuses based on arguments relating to the agency or the private 
sphere in which violations of this right are committed. States have responsibilities in the 
eradication of gender violence to guarantee women’s rights. As a result, these rights are 
subject to the scrutiny of various human rights treaty bodies which monitor them from 
different perspectives (the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, the Human Rights Committee, the Committee against Torture and the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child) and, where applicable, the object of 
communication by virtue of the corresponding Optional Protocol. They are also subject 
to examination and information-gathering under the terms of the mandates that protect 
such rights directly or indirectly, in particular by the Special Rapporteur on violence 
38 After an exhaustive analysis, Bonita Meyersfield (2012: 106-107) concludes that from a technical point 
of view it is indisputable that the right can be exercised from the perspective of international law. 
39 UN - ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, In-depth study on all forms of violence against women. Report 
of the Secretary-General, 2006 (A/61/122/Add.1), paragraph 39. This study included contributions from a 
wide range of experts and is an important reference point in the establishment of the right of women to a 
life free from gender violence. 
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against women, its causes and its consequences, and the Special Rapporteur on torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Similarly, in the 
regional sphere, the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating 
violence against women and domestic violence establishes monitoring and control 
measures by means of a Group of Experts and the Committee on action against violence 
against women and domestic violence40. 
 
However, the right of women to a life free from gender-based violence cannot be 
fully realised without transferring the implementation of this right from the international 
to the local level. This message needs to be articulated in the discourse on rights at the 
local level where the appropriate actions also need to be taken to implement this right. 
Including this right with other fundamental rights protected in state constitutions such as 
the rights to liberty, equality, life, security and non-discrimination would establish 
guarantees of the protection and enforceability of this right at a local level.   
 
As suggested above, there is still a long way to go before women’s rights are 
fully and effectively achieved, especially the right to a life free from gender violence. 
The delay in the recognition of these rights says a great deal about the context and the 
prevailing ideology which for decades has put so many obstacles in the path to such 
recognition.  
 
The struggle for the right of women to a life free from gender violence is marked 
by the need to address impediments to the main features of this right. In the first place, 
its recognition involves transformations and developments that must be considered as a 
“revolutionary and evolutionary process” (Thomas and Beasley 1995: 1147) in which 
the feminist movement and the involvement of women’s organisations are 
fundamentally important, which could thus be characterised as a “bottom up” process 
both at the international and national levels. Secondly, the inclusion of the language of 
rights in the struggle against gender violence –admittedly a complex and dialectical 
process –initially occurs at an international level and thus requires putting this 
development into practice at a local level, based on the consideration of gender violence 
as a violation of rights. 
 
The recognition of the right of women to a life free from gender violence has 
proved to be especially relevant in highlighting the influence of social movements in the 
recognition of rights and the actions of women’s organisations in making such rights 
effective in practice. The legislative intervention against gender violence advocated 
within the framework of the legal reformism was at all times influenced by the actions 
of the feminist movement and women’s organisations. Subsequently, in the last decades 
of the 20th century, the international human rights movement and national women’s 
movements promoted the recognition of the right of women to a life free from gender 
violence and the consequent classification of gender violence as a human rights 
violation. In both cases, as shown in the previous section, the driving force behind 
women’s human rights and their specific right to a life free from violence can be 
40 This Convention came into force on 1/8/2014, after ratification by 10 states.  
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regarded as a “bottom up” process41. 
 
The history of human rights shows the importance of enshrining these rights in 
legislation and in local practice to ensure their implementation. In other words, it is 
necessary to identify gender violence as a human rights issue in all contexts and at all 
levels (Thomas and Beasley 1995). The laws for eradicating gender violence should 
combine this action with the implementation of women’s rights, incorporating 
developments in the international human rights system insofar as it relates to women’s 
rights and also the recognition of fundamental rights such as those of liberty, equality, 
life, security and non-discrimination found in democratic constitutions42. The other step, 
also fundamental for achieving the desired objectives, is the incorporation of the 
language of rights in the practice and actions of social movements. This implies first 
introducing the language of rights in practice. Perhaps the fundamental step is 
introducing the language and the defence of rights in actions against gender violence in 
the courts and in those institutions responsible for prevention and the protection of 
victims. It is essential that the arguments based on the discourse of human rights and the 
advances in international human rights law should appear in judicial decisions. 
However, this obviously will not occur spontaneously43. This would require the active 
intervention of the women’s movement and of human rights movements in general. 
Here it is important for women’s organisations to include arguments and resources in 
their discourse and strategies based on those of international and national mechanisms 
for the defence of human rights, and at the same time for women to realise that their 
struggle is not a personal one to be faced in isolation, but that their actions involve the 
full realisation of human rights. This in turn means that all people involved 
professionally in actions against gender violence and the protection of its victims should 
be conscious of this perspective (Choudhry and Herring 2006; Morgaine 2006). 
 
Perhaps the first question is how to help society and victims to treat the 
phenomenon of gender violence as a question of rights. It is clear that this is the first 
step towards reaching the point where all the actors involved in the fight against gender 
violence accept the language of rights and the possibilities that this perspective offers. 
Sally E. Merry has shown in several empirical research studies the way in which women 
victims of gender violence have come to realise that the aggression they suffer 
represents a violation of their rights 44. She has made it clear that rights consciousness 
41 Merry et al. (2010) use this terminology, paraphrasing Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito, eds (2005). 
42 This was done in Spain with the “Ley Orgánica 1/2004” of 28 December 2004  on “Medidas de 
Protección Integral contra la Violencia de Género” (Comprehensive Protection Measures against 
Gender-based Violence). From many points of view this legislative development is insufficient because 
the language of rights in this law does not recognize a “specific” right of women to a life free from gender 
violence. Nevertheless, it is an important step forward given that it clearly does use the language of rights 
in addressing gender violence. 
43 For example, when addressing the constitutionality of the above-mentioned law, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court in its decision 59/2008 not only failed to directly recognize the right of women to a 
life free from gender-based violence, but paradoxically it also avoided using the language of rights in 
relation to the protection of victims and the eradication of gender violence. 
44 Sally Engle Merry has conducted various empirical research studies demonstrating this process, 
arriving at conclusions that cannot be ignored. One of the first presentations of this research can be seen 
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does not precede their implementation. In fact, her investigations suggest that 
“implementation is fundamental to establishing human rights consciousness” (Merry 
2003: 381). The adoption of the perspective of rights depends on a subjective 
construction that must be based on individual experiences lived in the social 
environment. Thus the implementation of rights and the existence of social movements 
involved with the human rights of women in practice, particularly their right to a life 
free from gender violence, is decisive (Merry 2003). 
 
The intervention of women’s movements based on the resource of human rights 
is fundamental for putting the individual experiences of gender violence victims within 
a wider framework from which the abuse can be considered as a social problem. This 
can lead to a collective identification which favours the development of an individual 
consciousness that must overcome the idea that gender violence is confined to a private 
and individual sphere (Schneider 1986: 611 ff.). Only this change motivated by the 
internalizing of the right to a life free from gender violence will allow women to go 
beyond moral judgements anchored in the breeding ground of a patriarchal society and 
the demands for protection from violence and its eradication to be met not as a question 
of mercy, but as a question of justice (Schneider 1986: 615, following Gilligan 1993: 
128 ff.). 
 
In conclusion, the implementation of women’s rights in general and the right to a 
life free from gender-based violence in particular at a local level is fundamental. To 
achieve this, the rights must be passed into legislation and local practice at an 
institutional level in addition to the intervention of the women’s movement and 
organisations. The incorporation of the language of rights can contribute to 
strengthening the actions of the women’s movement against gender violence. Including 
the discourse of rights within the activism of social movements has been shown to be a 
positive element in achieving their objectives45. This has also been the case in the fight 
of the women’s movement for the recognition of full equality, for their reproductive 
rights and for the eradication of gender violence. The impetus to achieving rights from 
the “bottom up” approach has an especially important transforming potential. However, 
as the experiences of the feminist movement in the defence of women’s rights have 
shown, lowering the guard in the fight for women’s rights could lead to the idea that 
once rights have been internationally recognised and implemented in national 
legislation, the obligations and responsibilities for the exercise of these rights lies with 
the state, an idea which could disarm the women’s movement in its efforts for ensuring 
the effective realisation of such rights (Schneider 1986: 630). A more complex analysis 
of the mechanisms of social power and the design, on the part of the women’s 
movement and organisations, of more wide-reaching actions of social intervention 
complementary to state intervention may perhaps result in a more productive strategy in 
terms of social change. To see legal change reflected in social transformations, it is 
in Merry (2003: 343-381). She later considered the question within a much broader cultural perspective 
and provided comparisons with other research studies in Merry (2005: 179 ff.) 
45 Obviously there are opinions to the contrary and, in general, about the limitations imposed by 
enclosing the feminist struggle in the discourse of rights (Elson 2006: 107 ff.; Nash 2002) 
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important for civil society to act in order to ensure the effectiveness of legally 
recognised rights and to take action which complements public policies. 
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